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Departmental Seminar, November 29th 2000, Istituto Universitario Europeo. I would
like to thank all those who attend the session for their comments,  and criticisms.
4"…che gli stati non si tenevonno co' paternostri in
mano"
(Cosimo il Vecchio)
N. Machiavelli: Istorie Fiorentine, VII, 6
"Heaven for the climate, hell for the company"
S. de Grazia: Machiavelli in Hell, p. 318
5This paper deals with some elements of Machiavelli's theory of political action
and its relation with tragedy and choice. In order to clarify my argument I will
proceed as follows. 1. I will sketch three different interpretations of his work: the
strategic, the republican, and the tragic readings of Machiavelli. 2. In second place, I
will analyze how political action often involves tragic choices between common good
and justice, and how this fact might develop (or not) political judgement and the
virtue of compassion among citizens. 3. Afterwards, I will consider the relationship
between tragedy and irony, and their dangerous connections with cruelty, with
particular attention to the work of Machiavelli. 4. Finally, I will try to summarize the
argument and to answer (tentatively) the question: Was Machiavelli a tragic
thinker?.
1. The Plurality of Machiavellis.
1.1 Strategy: the Isolated Subject.
There was a time in which Machiavelli was considered the main antecedent
of the strategic model of political action and one of the first theorists of the current
model of political choice. A model which is dominated by purposive rationality,
calculation, strategy, utility and rational choice.2 To be sure, there are reasons for
considering Machiavelli an antecedent of this tradition. Specially if we follow the so
called "realistic interpretations". According to them, Machiavelli would be a theorist
essentially concerned with the technical-political problems of action and choice.
Schopenhauer employed a brilliant metaphor in regard to the Machiavellian
teachings which underlined this technical character. The Florentine would teach
politics in the same way that a teacher of fencing might impart his art: without
prejudging who is the fencer (an honest man or a scoundrel)  or to what ends he will
dedicate the teachings (to free a princess or to murder venerable elders). Carl
Schmitt preferred to refer to an engineer in order to personify the type of political
action recommended by Machiavelli. Leonardo Olschki compared him to the
                                      
2 For strategic action see J. Habermas: The Theory of Communicative Action I.
Reason and the Rationalization of Society, Beacon Press, Boston, 1984. On the
other hand, the current model of political choice might be understood as defined by
four elements: 1. Conmensurability (everything is measurable in a single scale); 2.
Aggregation (a social result is obtained  by aggregating individual outcomes); 3.
Maximizing (individual and social rationality are aimed at getting  as much as
possible of 'utility'); 4. Exogenous preferences (preferences are considered to be
given). See an acute criticism in M. Nussbaum: Poetic Justice. The Literary
Imagination and the Public Life, Beacon Press, Boston, 1995, pp. 14 ff. May be I
should mention too the strategic readings of Machiavelli in the growing bibliography
that connect his theory with management, marketing, etc.
6architects of the Renaissance, concerned above all with the resolution of technical
problems. Ernst Cassirer employs the image of the chess player, who is
passionately interested in the game itself, but who does not pay any attention to the
potential cruelty of the rules of the game (why do so many pawns have to die?) or to
the meaning of its goal (to checkmate). 3
In all these examples, it is supposed that neither the fencer, nor the
engineer, nor the architect, nor the chess player receive any formative impact on
their character through action and choice. When action and choice are considered
merely as technical devices (means to achieve ends), then the theory of political
action focuses exclusively on the skill with which the ends are pursued: a good stab,
a strong bridge, a functional building, a smart move. The subject of the action is
either skillful or not: this is all that can be said about it. According to this, the
subject maintain a merely technical relationship with means (which are of use or not
to achieve ends, but should not to be judged immanently) and is completely isolated
from ends (which are supposed to be self-evident or given)4. In fact, the subject has
no other link with the world but "technical reason".
Normally these readings tend to be related to the separation between ethics
and politics that Benedetto Croce pointed out.5 Ethics would be the refuge of self-
identity, of values, of the character of the subject, and, essentially, it would belong
to the private sphere. Politics, which one would reach through the "path of wrong
doing"6, would be an essentially technical activity based on calculation, strategy,
and instrumental rationality. Nothing, or practically nothing, would connect both
                                                                                                             
3 See E. Cassirer: The Myth of he State, Doubleday, Garden City- New York, 1953;
L Olschki: Machiavelli the Scientist, The Gillick Press, Berkeley, 1945; C. Schmitt:
Die Diktatur, Duncker & Humboldt, Berlin, 1964; etc.
4 Sebastian de Grazia (Machiavelli in Hell, Vintage Books, New York, 1994, p. 306.)
comments that since in Machiavelli cruelty can be used (or not used) well or badly,
cruelty became a tool, an instrument "detachable from the person using it".
5 See B. Croce: Etica e politica, Laterza, Bari, 1981: “...il Machiavelli scopre la
necessità e l’autonomia della politica, della política che é di là, o piutosto di qua, del
bene e del male morale, che ha la sue leggi, a cui è vano ribellarsi, che non si può
esorcizzare, e cacciare dal mondo con l’acqua benedetta” (p. 205).
6 See N. Machiavelli: Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio, in Tutte le
Opere, a cura di Mario Martelli, Sansoni, Firenze, 1971, Book I, Chapter 9
(hereafter: D, I, 9). English version L.J. Walker, Penguin Books, Harmodsworth,
Middlesex, 1986.
7spheres, since they are ruled by different logoi7. Furthermore, the specific logos of
politics would be defined by a typical statement which is widely considered to be
Machiavelian: the attainment of the (political) end justifies the use of (immoral)
means.
Despite appearances, I think that these strategic interpretations are very
similar indeed to those given by Leo Strauss and his school. As a matter of fact,
when they  refer to Machiavelli as a "teacher of evil", this is not due to any personal
evil deed the Florentine had committed. Rather he is supposed to be "teacher of evil"
because: 1. He thinks that man is "the lord of everything", i.e. should do as s/he
pleases; 2. He considers that man should think and act strategically in order to
attain his/her goals (whatever the means, whatever the goals); 3. He affirms that in
this task man is isolated (from the community, from the tradition) and unbound
(from morals, from ethics, from religion).8
So Machiavelli would be guilty of having introduced in our tradition an idea
of "choice" completely free from any linkage (with tradition, with humanitarian
concerns, with a set of fixed values, with morals, etc.). Furthermore, this "free
choice" would be considered by Machiavelli as a proof of the deep relationship that
exists between good and evil.9 Even in republics, political virtue, and legitimate
institutions might be supported through evil actions… and they often are…10 So,
according to Strauss, strategic action is the root of evil in Machiavelli's writings
                                      
7 See, for instance, M. García Pelayo: Del mito y de la razón en la historia del
pensamiento político, Ed. Revista de Occidente, Madrid, 1968.
8 See L. Strauss: Political Philosophy, Pegasus, New York, 1975, p. 85: also
H.C.Mansfield Jr.: Machiavelli's New Modes and Orders, Cornell University Press,
Ithaca & London, 1979, p. 441.
9 “ ...evil is so closely associated with good, and so bound up are they one with the
other, that it may easily happen that he who thinks he will get one, gets the other"
(Che sempre propinquo al bene sia qualche male, il quale con el bene sí facilmente
nasca che pare impossibile potere mancare del’uno volendo l’altro", D, III, 37); also
against Soderini: “What he failed to realice was that time waits for no man, that
goodness alone does not suffice, that fortune is changeable and that malice is not to
be placated by gifts” (“... e non sapeva che il tempo non si può aspettare, la bontá no
basta, la fortuna varia e la malignità non trova dono che la plachi” -D, III, 30); see
also: D, I, 26; D, III, 3; also Il Principe chapter 18  (en Tutte le Opere, M. Martelli
ed., (Milan. Feltrinelli, 1971; English translation by G. Bull, Harmondsworth,
Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1986; hereafter P, 18); etc. Also Lettere (en ibidem;
hereafter Lett.) “Niccolò Machiavelli a Francesco Guicciardini”, 17 maggio 1521: “...il
vero  modo ad andare in Paradiso [sarebbe] imparare la via dello Inferno per fuggirla”
10 See L. Strauss: Thoughts on Machiavelli, The University of Chicago Press,
Chicago, 1984, p. 262; also H.C.Mansfield Jr: Machiavelli's Virtue, The university
of Chicago Press, Chicago & London, 1998, p. 19.
8because it "unbinds" the subject and make him/her aware of the close connection
between politics and evil.
May be the best example of this type of action in Machiavelli is, I think, the
new prince. Take, for instance, the case of Cesare Borgia. Being, as he is, without
any traditional or transcendental legitimization for his rule, and facing all the risks
of politics, he is forced (this is what Machiavelli want us to believe) to use violence,
cruelty an fraud to survive and to success. In P,18, Machiavelli says: “You must
realize this: that a prince, specially a new prince, cannot observe all these things
which give men reputation for virtue, because in order to maintain his state he is
often forced to act in defiance of good faith, of charity, of kindness, of religion. And
so he should have a flexible disposition, varying as fortune and circumstances
dictate (...) he should not deviate from what is good, if that is possible, but he should
know how to do evil, if necessary” (“sapere entrare nel male, necesitato”).11
      Nevertheless, even the new prince is a bad example of strategic action as such.
In fact, for Machiavelli the new prince is bound to some sort of common good.
Commenting on Cesare Borgia he affirms that he uses cruelty to reach union, peace
and loyalty, and to give his subjects in Romagna “well being” and “good government”
(P, 7, 18). So may be the strategic model of action applies mostly to Machiavelism
rather than to Machiavelli. After all, perhaps only Machiavelism would meet the
requirements  of an isolated and unbound subject, purely technical means and the
ends being “whatever” end the subject (whoever) considers appropriate.
                                      
11 Also: P, 7; P, 17; P, 19; etc.
9TABLE 1: THE STRATEGIC MODEL OF POLITICAL ACTION.
1. Subject of political
action (linked to the
"world" through technical
reason)
1.1. Isolated 1.1.1. From tradition
1.1.2. From community
1.2. Unbound 1.2.1. From morality
1.2.2. From ethics
1.2.3. From religion
2. Means 2.1. In “technical” relation
to subject.
2.1.1. No formative impact
(except strategic impact).
2.2. In “technical” relation
to ends.
2.2.1. Efficacy (to reach
the goal)
2.2.2. Efficiency (to reach
the goal at lowest price)
2.3. Transgression of
morality: autonomy of
politics. Ethics/politics
different Logoi. Good and
evil intertwined.
2.3.1. Means justified by
ends (transgressions
justified by political
success)
3. Ends 3.1. Ends as given. 3.1.1. Whatever end
(Machiavelism)
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According to this, we may define strategic action as follows:
1. The achievement of your ends (mostly to attain, to maintain, and to increase
your power)
2. Justifies and legitimates the utilization of any technically adequate mean
(regardless its morality)
3. Which permits you, the subject (new prince, tyrant, or literally “whoever”), to
obtain your goals.
1.2. Republic: Means and Ends.
Nonetheless, there are many Machiavellis in Machiavelli, and many of them do
not fit the paradigm of strategic action and choice in the form suggested by these
interpretations. The Machiavellian lesson goes further. It points out toward the
problem of tragic choice and political action to be found at the heart of a republican
community.
In order to understand the strategic model, one must relate it to a set of
Machiavellian concepts in which that of corruption stands out. Corruption is identified
by Machiavelli with a specific kind of political action that reflects the absence of virtù in
citizens 12, as well as the breakdown of the internal equilibrium in the community 13. In
this way, corruption is exemplified by a specific kind of action: particularistic actions
intended to defend and further private interests 14. That is, corruption is associated
precisely with one kind of action and one kind of subject 15: the isolated, privatized and
egotistical individual. Thus, the corrupt subject would be one whose private world (the
protection or furtherance thereof) turns out to be the point of reference for public
action. That subject in whose private and egotistical calculations there is only room for
strategic linkages justified from the perspective (absolute, undifferentiated, prior and
                                      
12. See N. Wood: "Machiavelli's Concept of Virtù Reconsidered", Political Studies, xv,
2, 1967.
13. See J.G.A. Pocock: The Machiavellian Moment. Florentine Political Thought
and the Atlantic Republican Tradition, Princenton N.J.: Princenton University
Press, 1975.
14. See Q. Skinner: "Machiavelli on the Maintenance of Liberty", Politics, 18, 2,
December 1983.
15. For other meanings of corruption in the work of Machiavelli, see M. Viroli:
Machiavelli, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998, pp. 131 ff.. Also A. Bonadeo:
Corruption, Conflict, and Power in the Works and Times of Niccolò Machiavelli,
Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1973.
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apolitical) of his gain. In other words, there is a sense in which the corrupt subject  in
Machiavelli, would be, precisely, that subject who thinks and acts through the model of
strategic action.
According to the republican interpretation16, the goal of political action in the
Machiavellian model consists in the protection and promotion of the virtuous
community. Acting in plurality and competition, citizens try to excel, and to develop
common good. Under these circumstances, the strategic model of action, in pursuit of a
specific purpose (political liberty),  is completely transformed. In the first place,  now
political action has undeniable effects on the character and identity of the citizens and
on the republican political way of life. For the republican model, action is not only a
logical craftiness, but a political act with immediate consequences for the citizens who
engage in it and  for the city in which they live. In fact, this is the way in which public
education develops, because it is through participation in a vivere civile that the subject
of political action learns (about politics, about him/herself, about public deliberation,
about political tensions, etc.) So the subject is neither isolated from tradition and
community,  nor can be considered “unbound” of any political rules. Certainly, the
republican citizen has to pursue common good and, at the same time, has to built that
common good in terms of liberty, plurality and competition. So traditions of the political
community constitute an integral part of his/her identity (though, the competent citizen
should know what to use and what to discard in them).
Furthermore, because Machiavelli tries to recover (from certain republican
traditions) a knowledge of political preservation, his intention, in this case, is to
remember, selectively, those features of classical politics that could be useful to his
political situation. According to some interpreters,17 the knowledge of preservation
implies maintaining and developing political memory, whilst the knowledge of political
foundation of the new requires the art of forgetting. One must know what to remember
and what to silence, from what to take an ironical distance and with whom to identify in
a political way. As we will see, this requires a tragic choice to the extent that such a
choice occurs within the realm of insecurity, of contingency and of the contradictory
impulse of alternative courses of action. For the moment, it is important to underline
that Machiavelli lets the burden of this choice to fall on the shoulders of the political
                                      
16 On participation and self-control see D, I, 40; D, I, 53; on competition and
conflict see D, I, 2; Istorie Fiorentini, in Tute le Opere, cit., VII, 1; hereafter IF,
VII, 1; on laws and political rules D, I, 7; D, I, 18; D, I, 42; IF, III, 2; on memory
and republican liberty P, 5; D, II, 23; etc.
17 See B.J. Smith: Politics & Remembrance. Republican Themes in Machiavelli,
Burke and Tocqueville, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985, pp. 72-3.
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virtù of the subject. Thus, virtù ought to be defined as “lucid intelligence, without self-
indulgent dreams”, as Miguel Angel Granada puts it.18 That is, virtù  is not only
technical ability to pursue ends, but also intelligence for developing the linkage between
the means and ends in the action, courage for thinking against the current, and
determination to maintain certain elements of the political community (those connected
to liberty). In this sense, virtù adopts an intersubjective slant and centers itself in the
creation and/or development of a free political order, a vivere civile e libero, in the midst
of contingency and risk.
Concerning the “means” of political action, the republican model also
transforms the strategic reading. In this case, means are not related to ends in an
exclusively technical way. In fact,  in the republican model of action means “mediate”
ends. In this way, Machiavellian theory of political action would resemble strongly to
Aristotelian teleological action19. That is: means are conducive to the end, but they are
also an integral part of the end pursued. If this were the case, means cannot be of such
a nature as to destroy the public sphere, or to eliminate the conditions of liberty, or to
prevent future citizens to be free, etc. Certainly it is a very important part of
Machiavelli’s teachings that sometimes you have “to break the rules” to reinforce the
rules themselves. But what is important now is to be aware of the fact that the
“breaking of rules” cannot destroy the basis of political action itself. So, means are
important in themselves: they have immanent value, not only strategic value; they are
to be judged by the consequences, but the consequences integrate certain principles
(the defense and development of a vivere civile e libero under conditions of uncertainty
and risk). In other words, they cannot  eliminate the conditions for the flourishing of
some values and institutions (in the end itself). That would be the reason why
Machiavelli speaks about 1) actions in which the subject is “defeated”, but nevertheless
he considered him/her virtuous and 2) actions in which the subject successes, but is
clearly criticized by the Florentine. The first kind of actions can be exemplified by
Machiavelian concept of “glory”, the second one by Machiavelli’s criticisms on tyrants.
Lets take some examples of the treatment of glory in Machiavelli’s writings: 1.
You can die gloriously even if freedom of your city is lost in the battle (D, III, 41). 2. You
can fail gloriously (L’Asino, VII). 3. It is more glorious to be defeated by force than by a
                                      
18 See M.A. Granada: El umbral de la modernidad, Herder, Barcelona, 2000, p.
181.
19 According to J.L. Ackrill (“Aristotle on Eudeimonia”, in A. Rorty ed.: Essays on
Aristotle’s Ethics, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1980, pp 16 ff) the
Greek statement that Aristotle use to describe his theory of action ta pros to telos
would mean at the same time the instrumental means to reach an end and the fact
that the means are also an integral part of the goal pursued.
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failure of intelligence (D, III, 10). 4. Glory depends on difficulty and effort in the
performed action –the more difficult to reach the end, the more glorious the enterprise-
not on success (P, 24; D, I, 10).
In all these cases, glory is linked to virtuosity in performing the action, not to
the complete attainment of the end. So it seems that there is some kind of contradiction
in Machiavelli’s  theory of action, because sometimes it is more important to perform
the “proper action”, (virtuous action) than to have success. And this is a contradiction
because, as we will see, the core of his definition of political action is linked to
consequences, not to virtuous performance. Nevertheless, if we explore this problem,
we will find some interesting things.
In the first place, we will consider what we can call a “Quixotic” conception of
virtù in fighting against Fortune. Had Machiavelli only take into account political
consequences (success), why should he analyze actions performed  virtuously but
defeated in the end? Why bothering in praising, say,  Bruto or, for that matter, he
himself?  The answer is, I think, that for Machiavelli the virtuous character of the
subject of political action is also very important, and this implies that fighting fortune is
as important as to win. In effect, concerning politics (thinking, acting, judging) you have
to strive and to do everything in your hand. And, even if you are overwhelmed by
adverse fortune,  you should always fight and face with courage the circumstances. If in
the end you are defeated,  you can always obtain honor and glory due to your character
before adversity. So, you should never surrender: “[Men] should never give up, because
there is always hope, though they know not the end and move towards it along roads
which cross one another and as yet are unexplored; and since there is hope, they
should not despair, not matter what fortune brings or in what travail they found
themselves (sperando non si abandonare, in qualunque fortuna ed in qualunque travaglio
si truovino]” (D, II, 29).20
It is true that Machiavelli thinks that in victory glory is usually attained (D, III,
42). But it is also true that he speaks with scorn about successful tyrants (P, 8). One
reason for doing so has to do with a deeply rooted Machiavellian conviction: that
tyrant’s interest always are against the common good (“for what he does in his own
interest usually harms the city, and what is done in the interest of the city harms him”
“...più delle volte quello che fa per lui, offende la città e quello che fa per la città, offende
                                      
20 This “quixotic” interpretation might also be related to existentialism. For
existentialists the subject of action must confer human meaning to the universe
through fighting against contingency, in spite of the fact that the “meaning” does not
exist before the fight, but it is created in it. See P. Cerezo: Las máscaras de lo
trágico, Trotta, Madrid, 1996, pp. 288 ff.
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lui” -D, II, 2). A second and equally important reason is that those tyrants corrupt the
political modes of the city,  ruin the basis of communal liberty, eliminate virtù in
citizens, do not take into account the mediation of means and ends, do not consider
that means cannot destroy the very basis of political action itself, etc., and in doing so
the tyrant destroy the republic. And  the destruction of the republic is the destruction of
the core of political action: the attainment of a common way of life that protects public
liberties as well as private interests (D, I, 16; D, II, 2; P, 21).
Nevertheless, even if we consider from this standpoint the relationship of means
and ends in Machiavelli’s thought, there is still a serious problem.  Citizens perform
virtuous actions pursuing the common good, but in doing so, they often break the
prevalent moral framework. The tension between morality and politics seems to be
installed at the core of political action, no matter whether we consider it from  a
strategic or from a republican point of view. This fact derives from a profound
conviction in Machiavelli: the distinction between the common good and justice. This
distinction has been highlighted by Quentin Skinner: "... if the promotion of the
common good is genuinely your goal, you must be prepared to abandon the ideal of
justice" 21. That is, we cannot claim that certain virtues, whether public or private
(being true, being just or not being cruel), are always or often compatible with the
pursuit of the good of the community, so that the subject of the action must bear the
burden of this tension and assume that, at times, he will use undesirable means to
reach desirable ends (from the point of view of the city) 22.
Naturally, we may think that there is a mistake involved in thinking that we
have to choose between these two worlds (that of justice and that of the common good).
We may think that everything is possible at the same time: justice and common good.
Furthermore, for many thinkers (from Cicero to Kant, from Habermas to Dworkin)
justice and common good reinforce each other and we cannot consider them in any
serious internal tension.23 Nevertheless, according to Machiavelli, this choice is
unavoidable and at times tragic. It is true that the choice is not between private and
public worlds, between, for example, ethics (personal and linked to principles) and
                                                                                                             
21. See Q. Skinner: "Machiavelli's Discorsi and the Prehumanist Origin of Republican
Ideas", G.Bock, Q. Skinner and M. Viroli eds: Machiavelli and Republicanism,
Cambridge Mass: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 136.
22. See, also, Q. Skinner: The Foudations of Modern Political Thought, vol I,
Cambridge Mass: Cambridge University Press, 1978, p. 183.
23 For comments and criticisms on those theories see R. Del Águila: La senda del
mal. Política y razón de Estado, Taurus, Madrid, 2000, chapters 3 and 4.
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politics (collective and linked to consequences). The choice is between a life of autonomy
and security, a meaningful political life, and a life of apolitical submission in which
there is not even the guarantee that cruelty and injustice will be absent24.
Furthermore, a wrong choice would have disastrous effects for the community and for
the subject(s): to avoid using unjust methods we condemn ourselves to experience
situations in which we will have to use more injustice and cruelty than which would
originally have been required (P, 8). That is, it seems Viroli is right when he affirms25
that, for Machiavelli, only the institution and defense of a free political life is "worthy of
a good man. Even if it requires him to do evil". Paraphrasing Pocock26, we can say that,
if this is the case, the truly subversive Machiavelli is not the strategic thinker but the
good citizen and the patriot.
                                      
24. Machiavelli's texts are clear on this point: "... an evil should never be allowed to
continue out of respect for a good when that good may be easily overwhelmed by that
evil" (“non si debbe mai lasciare scorrere un male, rispetto a uno bene, quando quel bene
facilmente possa essere, de quel male, opressato” -D, III, 3). So, “chi piglia una tirannide
e non ammazza a Bruto, e chi fa uno stato libero e non ammazza i figliuoli di Bruto, si
mantiene poco tempo” (ibid.)
25. See M. Viroli: "Machiavelli and the Republican Idea of Politics", G. Bock, Q. Skinner
and M. Viroli eds: Machiavelli and Republicanism, op.cit., p. 171.
26. See J.G.A. Pocock: The Machiavellian Moment, op.cit., p. 218.
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TABLE 2: THE REPUBLICAN MODEL OF POLITICAL ACTION.
1. Subject (republican
citizen)
1.1. Plurality and
competition.
1.1.1. Related to
(republican) tradition.
1.2. Education through
deliberation and
participation.
1.2.1. Bound by civic
virtue.
2. Means. 2.1. In formative relation
to subject.
2.1.1. Virtù.
2.2. In teleological
(mediated)  relation to
ends.
2.2.1. Protection of vivere
civile e libero.
2.3. Tensions between
Common Good and
Justice.
2.3.1. Using undesirable
means (from the
perspective of morality)
might be conducive to the
attainment of desirable
(political) ends.
3. Ends 3.1. Vivere civile e libero.
Maintained and developed
through plurality and
competition, under
conditions of risk and
uncertainty.
3.1.1. So the ends are
neither given, nor fixed,
nor crystallised, and its
attainment is uncertain
and insecure.
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So, we can define the republican model of political action as follows:
1. Republican citizens acting in plurality and competition, in the context of the
tradition of the city and bound by its civic virtue…
2. Choose, with virtù (knowledge, courage) the means (at times morally dubious) to
achieve political ends and in doing so …
3. They protect or develop a vivere civile e libero under conditions of uncertainty
and insecurity.
1.3. Tragedy: the Internal Tension of Action.
I think that the internal tragic tension in Machiavelli's theory of action is well
grasped by Isaiah Berlin interpretation27. It is not, as Croce has put it, that
Machiavelli emancipates politics from ethics. It is that he differentiates between two
incompatible ideals of life and two different moralities. One, the political morality, is
pagan and its values are courage, vigor, fortitude, public achievement, strength,
and "assertion of one's proper claims and the knowledge and power needed to secure
their satisfaction"28. The other is Christian morality and its ideals are charity, mercy,
sacrifice, forgiveness, contempt for the goods of this world, salvation, etc.
Machiavelli affirms that those who follow this second path can neither build nor
maintain a vivere civile e libero, that is, a free and legitimate political order. So the
clash between these two ethics is unavoidable and the tension it produces can only
be faced by the subject of action with virtù. And, for Machiavelli, only those citizens
and those republics who are virtuous in this sense can be considered adequate
subjects of political action.
This interpretation reminds strongly that of Max Weber's political man29. It is
well known that Weber makes a distinction between "an ethic of ultimate ends" (full
of "pure intentions", and whose goal is the "salvation of the soul"), and an "ethic of
responsibility", (properly political, linked to consequences and to responsibility for
that consequences). In that context he wrote: "The genius or demon of politics lives
                                      
27 See I. Berlin: "The Originality of Machiavelli", in Against the Current. Essays in
the History of Ideas, The Viking Press, New York, 1980.
28 Ibid., p. 45.
29 See M. Weber: Politics as a Vocation, in  From Max Weber. Essays on
Sociology, H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds., Routledge, London, 1998, pp. 120 ff.
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in an inner tension with the god of love", and also: "…both ethics are not absolute
contrasts, but rather supplements –which only in unison constitute a genuine man-
a man who can have the `calling of politics`".30 So here, as in the case of Machiavelli,
the tension between both ethics is constitutive of politics, the tragedy of choice is the
more important task of those engaged in politics, and the need of a virtuous subject
of political action is also regarded crucial  in order to face these dilemmas.
Clearly the key words of this model of action would be: virtù (knowledge and
courage) of the subject, tragic choice among the different courses of action, and the
ends linked to the common good. I think it is also very important to underline the
conviction shared by the three models of action (strategic, republican or tragic): not
always “good” means produce “good” results, not always evil means produce bad
results, there is no harmony in the world of politics and no way to escape this
dilemmas. This can be considered the main tension pointed out by Machiavelli: the
inner tension of politics and action.
Nevertheless, the task of almost everyone since the Renaissance seems to
have been to eliminate the "inner tension", to reconcile the "tragic choice", to
substitute (institutional) rules by (citizen’s) virtues. One way of doing that31 has been
to recur to the concept of necessity as the guide for choice and action. Where it is
"necessary", i.e. where there is, properly speaking, “no choice”, the reasons of
politics (survival, maintenance and empowerment) must impose themselves.
Otherwise we should tend toward moral behavior and justice. This is the typical
argument of the discipline of reason of state. Mostly from Italy, Spain, Germany
and France the theorists of the ragione degli stati, as Guicciardini have call them for
the first time, strive to build a set of rules of necessity. A set of rules which could
guide us, with certainty, in choice and action, and, for that reason, could help us to
overcome the tensions and contradictions of political action. 32
                                      
30 Ibid, pp. 126 and 127; also: "…in numerous instances the attainment of `good`
ends is bound to the fact that one must be willing to pay the price of morally
dubious means" (p. 121). Commenting on the close connection of Weber with Berlin
pluralism of values, Berlin said: "Quando proposi per la prima volta l'idea del
pluralismo dei valori, molto tempo fa, non avevo letto una pagina di Weber". See I.
Berlin: Tra Filosofia e Storia delle Idee. Intervista autobiografiche di Steven
Lukes, Ponte Alle Grazie, Firenze, 1994, p. 71. On this problem see E. García
Guitián: "Pluralismo y libertad en la obra de Isaiah Berlin, Tesis doctoral,
Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, 1997.
31 This is not the only way of doing it. Modernity has also tried to dissolve these
contradictions through the proper use of enlightened reason. See R. del Águila: La
senda del mal. Política y razón de Estado, op.cit., chapters 2 and 3.
32 The first and canonical definition of reason of State is: "Stato è un dominio fermo
sopra popoli, e ragione di Stato è notizia di mezzi atti a fondare, conservare ed
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Needles to say that this way of thinking about politics has attained security
and certainty at the expense of liberty. In fact, from reasons of State spring some of
the most clear examples of cruelty and criminal behavior of Western history. And not
just in the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries. Following this path of necessity, the
emancipatory tradition (jacobinism, leninism, etc.) as well as the radical
nationalism, fascisms, etc. have shown the dark side of modernity.
But, besides the “generation” of cruelty, the appeal to necessity is also
misguided in another sense. It is unable to produce any reconciliation, because it
presupposes what should be demonstrated: that is, that there exists a "natural" or
"objective" necessity and that such a necessity reveals itself in an evident way to
reason (or to science or to the avantgarde of the chosen ones), and that to follow
necessity means to sacrifice everything and everyone to it...
On this, Michael Walzer33 deserves to be quoted at length. Commenting on the
decision of the Athenians to destroy the city of Melos, as it was narrated by Thucydides
in The History of the Peloponesian War 34, he writes:
"Once the debate begins, all sorts of moral and strategic questions are likely to
come up. And for the participants in the debate, the outcome is not going to be
determined 'by the necessity of nature', but by the opinions they hold or come to
hold as a result of the arguments they hear and then by the decisions they
freely make, individually and collectively. Afterwards, the generals claim that a
certain decision was inevitable; and that, presumably, is what Thucydides
wants us to believe. But the claim can only be made afterwards, for inevitability
here is mediated by a process of political deliberation, and Thucydides could not
know what was inevitable until that process has been completed. Judgments of
necessity in this sense are always retrospective in character - the work of
historians, not historical actors" (my emphasis).
In a word, judgements of necessity can begin only when deliberation on them
has finished and those concerned consider clear that certain course of action seems
necessary and should be taken. If we accept that what Walzer affirms can also be
                                                                                                             
ampliare un dominio così fatto" (G. Botero: Della ragion di Stato. Delle cause
della grandeza della città, Arnaldo Forni, Bologna, 1990, p. 1). It should be noted
that the way in which the reconciliation of tensions proceeds here has to do with the
role of religion as a political device; see D. Saavedra Fajardo: Idea de un príncipe
cristiano representada en cien empresas, Academia Alfonso X el Sabio, Murcia,
1985, emp. 24. Also R. del Águila: La senda del mal. Política y razón de Estado,
op.cit., chapter 1.
33. See M. Walzer: Just and Unjust Wars, New York: Basic Books, 1992, p. 8.
34 See, 5: 84-116.
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applied in the case of Machiavelli, then there is no escape from, or comfort in, political
choice. Unable to base itself on any "indubitable necessity",35 it does not offer us the
certainty of getting it right, it does not give us solace or peace of mind. The choice is
structured, properly speaking, in tragic terms. And, what is perhaps more important,
the impact of deliberation, choice and action has penetrating and lasting consequences
for the constitution of our individual and collective identities because it is the choice
between alternative courses of action, not between separate spheres.
2. Tragedy, Justice and the Role of Compassion.
2.1. Action and Uncertainty.
To take seriously the problems of choice in the terms established by Machiavelli
also means taking seriously the creation of virtù in the citizens. Subjected to the tension
of having to decide in dilemmatic  situations, the citizens form and develop their
character and elaborate their capacity for judgment. But they do not do so only in the
peaceful development of communicative and dialogical  capacities. They do not do so
exclusively in the way Jürgen Habermas or the theorists of deliberative concept of
democracy suppose. They do so also through the experience of the tragic conflict. We
can define this conflict in terms of the formulations given by Martha Nussbaum 36: in
the cases of tragic conflict "we see wrong action committed without any direct physical
compulsion and in full knowledge of its nature, by a person [or a community] whose
ethical commitments would otherwise dispose him [or them] to reject the act. The
constraint comes from the presence of circumstances that prevent the adequate
fulfillment of two valid claims".37
                                      
35 Of course necessity plays an important role on Machiavelli, but it is not
understood in a merely technical way. See, D, I, 32; D, I, 38; D, III, 11; P, 18; P,
25; etc. Also F. Guicciardini: Considerazioni in torno ai Discorsi del
Machiavelli, a cura de Corrado Vivanti, in N. Machiavelli: Discorsi sopra la prima
deca di Tito Livio, Enaudi, Torino, 1983, Book I, Chapter 1. Also, R. Del Águila: La
senda del mal, op.cit., pp. 97 ff. Anyway, for the relation between necessity and
“anthropological pessimism” in Machiaveli see P, 18; D, I, 3; Scritti Politici en
Tute le Opere, cit., p.12; hereafter SP; etc.
36. See M. Nussbaum: The Fragility of Goodness. Luck and Ethics in Greek
Tragedy and Philosophy, Cambridge Mass: Cambridge University Press, p. 25.
37.Nussbaum then quotes Socrates' belief (Euthyphro, 8a) that this collision is
repugnant to reason. Modernity has considered the tragic conflict to be equally
repugnant, as can be seen in its mechanisms to reconcile that tension: from the
already mentioned concept of necessity, to the enlightened idea of the essential
harmony between reason and nature, to the idea of progress or of history as
justification for present contradictions, etc. In fact, as Nussbaum again shows (ibid, p.
35), "such situations might be repellent to practical logic; they are also familiar from
the experience of life".
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Furthermore, as I already mention, the tragic conflict does not mean to choose
between spheres or values or groups of values that are placed there, before us, at our
disposal. We choose between alternative courses of action. Nor do we choose between
static and given identities (here, a just but politically irresponsible man; there, a
politically responsible but at times unjust man). We choose between courses of action
that will make us different according to the choices we make, according to our
deliberation and decision, according to the resulting action and the way in which we
will experience and remember the whole process.
Therefore it is political action itself which acquires a tragic tone. In fact, Aristotle
defined tragedy precisely in this way: "Tragedy is an imitation not of human beings but
of action and life", its effect being to arise fear and compassion in the spectator38. The
relation between tragedy and action, found in many places in the work of the Greek
thinker 39, is an integral part of a civic education in participation and politics. Hannah
Arendt 40 links the tragic character of action with the courage and determination
necessary to appear, speak and act in the public sphere, as well as with the uncertainty
of the ultimate consequences of such appearance, speech and action. In both cases she
highlights the impact that contingency has on action and, in turn, the impact that
action has on the self-identities of the individual and of the community. In this sense, a
virtuous action (guided by knowledge and courage) is above all risk and exposure to
Fortune (as Machiavelli would say).
Modernity always tried to minimize this risk in two ways. The first one is the
attainment of "rational mastery" over human affairs (of which a good example is the
application of strategy to politics, the concept of necessity and the discipline of reason
of State). The second one is to grant to action a justification which, a posteriori, could
give solace to the subject of action and reconcile him/her with his own self-image  (that
is, to avoid the tragic character of action and choice through the power of, say, Reason
or Science or Progress or History –in capital letters). We can argue about the
contribution of Machiavelli to the development of the first way (though I think his
                                      
38. See Aristotle: Poetics, in Aristotle Theory of Poetry and the Fine Arts, English
translation S.H. Butcher, New York: Dover Publications, 1955, parrs. 1450a9 and
1452a. My emphasis.
39. See J. Jones: On Aristotle and Greek Tragedy, Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1980, pp. 24ff.
40. See H. Arendt: The Human Condition, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1958, pp. 184ff.
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contribution is just indirect). But concerning the second one (“harmonization”), this is
just what Machiavelli did not do. 41
So, if we leave aside those modern narratives of reconciliation, if we assume the
impact on our identities that the tragic conflict has, and the need of "collective sharing
of responsibility" when that conflict is lived in contexts of democratic participation 42,
then maybe we might be able to learn something from it.
Greek tragedy offers us, in this regard, some crucial examples. Agamemnon is
not reproached by the Chorus for having chosen to sacrifice Iphigenia in order to satisfy
the demands of the gods and of the Trojan expedition. What the Chorus reproaches to
Agamemnon is the way in which he lives and experiences that tragic conflict: without a
single word of sorrow, without any painful memory of his decision 43. Supposing that
the decision was completely justified and that nothing else could have been done,
Agamemnon forgets the reasons and justifications that inclined him towards not
committing the ritual assassination. Agamemnon does not learn because he forgets
and, thus, fails as a human and rational being in his confrontation with the conflict:
forgetfulness silences arguments that were crucial in judgment and decision. 44
It is said that Hannah Arendt was preparing the third volume of her trilogy
(Thinking, Willing, Judging) just before her death. A few notes were found on a sheet
of paper in her typewriter,45  among which a phrase of Cato stands out as one of the
                                      
41 One of the curious coincidences between Th. Hobbes and I. Kant is the idea that
what makes science or reason better than prudence is that science and reason
dispel uncertainty and risks, and would give us security and truth: see Th. Hobbes:
Leviathan, C.B. Macpherson ed., Penguin, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1968,
Chapter 46; I. Kant: Political Writings, H. Reiss ed., Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1991, p.80.
42. See J.P. Euben: "Introduction" and A.J. Podlecki: "Polis and Monarch in Early Attic
Tragedy", in J.P. Euben ed: Greek Tragedy and Political Theory, Berkeley, Los
Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1986.
43. See M. Nussbaum: The Fragility of Goodness, op.cit., pp. 36ff.
44 We can say it with Montaigne:  "when an urgent circumstance (…)
induceth a Prince for the necessity of his state, or, as they say, for state
matters, to breake his worde and faith, or otherwise forceth him out of his
ordinary duty, he is to ascribe this necessity (…) But if he did it sans regret,
or scruple, if it greeved him not to doe it, 'tis an argument his conscience is
but ill” (“...s’il le fit sans regret, s’il ne lui greva (pesa) de la faire, c’est signe
que sa coscience est en mauvais terms”).  See M. de Montaigne: Essais, I, II,
and III, P. Michel ed., Libraire Genéralé Française, Paris, 1972; English
version J. Florio, Everyman Library, Dutton, New York, 1965. Book III,
Chapter 1.
45. Preparatory wrintings exists on the topic of Judgement, and some of which are
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last sentences of the manuscript: "Victrix causa deis placuit, sed victa Catoni" ("The
victorious cause pleased the gods, but the defeated one pleases Cato"). To keep the
defeated cause alive through memory in political judgment, to remember the costs of
the decision, what was left behind in the course of action and possibly will not be
recovered but nonetheless deserves to preserve its claim on us, this lies at the heart of
an adequate experience of the tragic conflict. This is the form in which virtuous citizens
will assume their education in participation. The exercise of political judgment in this
type of situation does not only require strategy as logical craftiness, but also a proper
balance before tragic choices. A balance that would make us aware of the unavoidable
tensions in the world of politics. To put it in another way: to remember the defeated side
of political judgment, as well as to remember and to feel concern for the victims of our
actions, are both politically important in two senses. First, they make us aware of what
we are doing. Second, they make us consider many things differently in the future. So
through remembering we got knowledge and experience. But for doing so properly we
need not only to remember, but to remember well, that is, to balance the imperatives of
closeness and compassion with those coming from the foundation and transformation
of a free political order. 46
2.2. Compassion, Tragedy and Machiavelli.
According to these criteria, was Machiavelli a tragic thinker? Was he sensitive to
the defeated side of political judgement? Did he balance adequately compassion and
                                                                                                             
published. Cfr. H. Arendt: Lectures on Kant Political Philosophy, R. Beiner ed,
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982; R. Beiner: "Hannah Arendt on
Judging", in ibidem; R. Beiner: Political Judgement, London: Methuen, 1983. See
also: R. Beiner: What is the Matter with Liberalism?, University of California Press,
Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, 1992, pp. 99 ff.
46 May be I should mention, in passing, an example of this kind of balance: the art of
silence in transitions to democracy. I think this is a good example of tragic choice
under conditions of uncertainty, which is quite usual in the real world. In this case,
the tragic choice would be between: 1. to do justice and to put the victims first,
prosecuting and castigating the guilty tyrants or, 2. being prudent (for reasons of
political stability), to silence these moral considerations (postponing them,
respecting them) setting aside justice for the maintenance and development of
common good (democracy). So if we are to choose tragically and properly, in these
cases we cannot apply the general rule: we always have to put justice first. Even if
“la sagezza republicana insegna (...) che per conservare un vivere civile (...) è
necessaria la massima severità nel punire i cittadini che si rendono responsabili di
rande colpe, suprattuto se si tratta di cittadini importanti, ben noti, potenti” (M. Viroli:
Republicanessimo, Laterza, Bari, 1999, pp. 90-1). No matter that Machiavelli wrote
about the necessity of “essecuzione memorabile” (D, III, 1), his teachings,
underlining the crucial importance of the vivere civile, would incline us to choose the
survival and development of the common good (say, democracy) even if we have to
sacrifice (to postpone) justice.
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detachment in political action? Did he experience the tragic choice “properly”? If one is
to believe  Berlin, he was not and he did not. No matter that:
1. he uncovers the fact that ultimate values often are not compatible with one
another;
2. for him evil remains evil, good, good, cruelty, cruelty;
3. he never showed any intention of “transvaluing ” their current meanings (as, for
instance, Nietzsche, Hegel, Mussolini or Lenin tried to do);
4. he never invokes any theological sanction (god, history) to obscure this fact;
5. no matter that he knows that to choose an ethics is to give up the other;
6.  and so every choice we make, in a sense, entails a lost;
7. no matter that he elaborates the elements of the tragic choice and juxtaposes
the different outlooks and, since then, nothing has been the same in European
Political Theory.
Berlin affirms that Machiavelli can not be considered a tragic thinker because
he never faces this situation (from 1 to 7) with anguish. In fact, there is no trace of
agony in his writings and it seems that for him there is no deep conflict: “he chooses his
side, and took little interest on the values [or the people, RdA] that this choice ignore”.47
On the other hand Benedetto Croce thinks that Machiavelli feels deep
bitterness  for the cruel conditions of politics, craving for a society of pure and good
men. So for him the Florentine is a tragic thinker in whom he perceives open signs
of an austere and painful moral conscience. 48 In a similar vein, Maurizio Viroli has
recently vindicated an interesting interpretation for Machiavelli’s smile. His would be
a smile that hides weeping and conceals pain, a defense before the meanness and
malignity of this world. Not only a way of facing live, but also a way of living it. 49
                                                                                                             
47 See I. Berlin: “The Originality of Machiavelli”, op.cit., p. 70. Also: “One chooses
what one chooses because one knows what one wants, and is ready to pay the price”
(p.75); “He... takes for granted the superiority of Rome antiqua virtus (...) over the
Christian life” (p. 77).
48 See B. Croce: Etica e Politica, op.cit., pp. 205-6: Machiavelli would experience
“acre amarezza” (...) “l’anelito del Machiavelli va verso un’inattingibile società di
uomini buoni e puri” (...) in him is clear the existence of “aperti segni di un’austera e
dolorosa coscienza moralle”.
49 See M. Viroli: Il sorriso di Niccolò, Laterza, Bari, 2000, pp. 143, 159, 169, 254,
etc: “un sorriso che nasconde il pianto (...) una diffesa che protegge daggli sguardi,
sconsolato e rassegnato di fronte a la malignità dil mondo”(...) “Un sorriso che muore
sulla labra e nasconde il dolore” (...) “il suo modo di difendersi della vita (...) anche il
suo modo di immergirse in essa”.
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So, Berlin considers that Machiavelli is not a tragic thinker because he sees
no evidence of compassion or of moral doubt in his writings. Since compassion and
doubt seems to be for Berlin unavoidable features of the proper experience of
tragedy,50 and since he thinks Machiavelli is too much ironical to be compassionate,
he concludes that our Florentine Secretary is not a tragic thinker. On the other
hand, Croce and Viroli consider him a tragic thinker precisely because they interpret
Machiavelli’s irony as a way of expressing moral disgust before the cruel condition of
the world. May be for Croce and Viroli, as a lawyer would say, “the absence of
evidence (of compassion) is not evidence of the absence (of compassion)”. Anyway,
the discussion about motives and intentions in Political Theory are rarely
conclusive. In fact we need a different approach to this issue. An approach that let
us analyze the relationship between irony, compassion and political action.
In first place, it is plain truth that Machiavelli could not be considered a
compassionate thinker. But, for that matter, there are no many thinkers that could.
Neither so disparate thinkers as Nietzsche and Kant. As Aurelio Arteta has pointed out,
in Western thought, compassion is a virtue under suspicion.51
According to Kant, a rational person will not accept any favours, since mutual
respect requires a certain distance and charitable compassion buries us in moral
heteronomy and, like disease, spreads by contagion. In this process, compassion
serves to mask the injustice and the lack of respect for the person who is suffering and
is often accompanied by inaction and political and moral lethargy. This is why it can be
said that if justice reigned in the world (the goal which Kant thinks we should aspire to)
compassion would be unnecessary.
For Nietzsche, on the other hand, if suffering humiliates the victim, our
compassion endows us with superiority. In this way, when we see someone suffering
we happily seize the opportunity to "take control of him/her". Whoever is the “object” of
this sentiment of compassion, s/he may well feel humiliated and rejected because the
piety of others reveals his/her own prostration. By accepting it, the sufferer shows to
be worthy only of disgust. That is, the pious degrade us.
If what both these authors are saying makes any sense, then we need to make
certain changes in the conception of compassion if we are to vindicate it as an integral
                                      
50 In that he would agree with Aristotle: see footnote 38.
51 See A. Arteta: La compasión. Apología de una virtud bajo sospecha, Paidós,
Barcelona, 1996. For Kant's and Nietzsche's opinions on compassion see pp. 65 ff,
87 ff, 216 ff, etc.
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part of political action and tragedy. We have to convert indignation, sentimentalism
and charity into commitment, empathy and solidarity.
In his Poetics (1452b) Aristotle states that the compassion which  tragedy
provokes in us was due to the fact that the person who was suffering was doing so
unjustly, as well as because s/he was someone "like us". From this perspective,
compassion is, therefore, a bridge towards others, a form of understanding them as
fellow human beings. In the same way,  Jean Jacques Rousseau observed in Emile
how reflection on the misfortunes of others exposes our own vulnerability. This is what
Aurelio Arteta called the "nutritive soil of piety": our own human vulnerability.
Compassion, therefore, is the piety and fear derived from reflection on our similarities
with the sufferer.52
But similarity (with the sufferer) is not equality. In the empathy which comes
from compassion there is always a sharp sense of separation and difference with
respect to the situation of the sufferer. Adopting the perspective of a reflexive observer,
compassion seeks to understand the conditions, causes, etc., of suffering. As Martha
Nussbaum notes53, the misfortunes of others can only be appreciated and judged
through reflection which relates them to what we already understand. Aurelio Arteta,
in turn, observes that piety "enters into the order of virtue when it is the product of
reflexive knowledge and practice". And this reflexive practice makes compassion a
tragic virtue in two senses. Firstly, because it springs from a knowledge of human
tragedy. Secondly, because it must renounce to formalism and neutralism and always
remains conscious of the possibility of error.54
Thus if we want to overcome Kantian and Nietzschean critiques, then direct
experience of tragedy in action must be accompanied by reflection and rationality. And
this could mean that commitment, empathy and solidarity should be understood as
part of a civic education capable of teaching us to choose between alternative courses of
political action without being guided exclusively neither by our “immediate” sentiments
and feelings nor by an “objective rule”, that make for us unnecessary to choose.
                                                                                                             
52 Ibid., pp. 40 and 42.
53 See M. Nussbaum, "Compassion: The Basic Social Emotion", Social Philosophy
and Practice, 13, 1 (Winter 1996), pp. 34 ff.
54 See,  Arteta, La compasión, op.cit., pp. 138-39. Arteta only refers to the first tragic
component of the virtue of compassion, and only very indirectly to the second (pp. 258
ff.).
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But, whatever our re-reading of compassion, we will not be able to find it in
Machiavelli´s writings.  It is true that part of Machiavelli’s teachings have to do with
“cooling down immediate sentiments” in political action, but this does not incline him
toward commitment, empathy and solidarity with the victims, except in an indirect way
(for instance: in order to get a reasonable just political order that decreases the
prevalent amount of cruelty, you have to act cruelly). I think Isaiah Berlin is right in
this. Furthermore, Berlin argument is not exactly that Machiavelli shows no
compassion for the possible victims created by choosing a political morality instead of a
Christian one. What Berlin says is that Machiavelli forgets completely the defeated side
of the political judgement (that is, the reasons that would incline us to choose the
opposite course of action). But Berlin, in turn, forgets the possible reasons why
Machiavelli thinks he should set aside compassion and the defeated side of political
judgement. These Machiavellian reasons could be related to the necessity to act.
Perhaps, in order to decide on a position which identifies the political problems which
are at stake, which considers alternative courses of action to remedy the situation
(defined by insecurity, cruelty, and injustice), we need to postpone compassionate
considerations. Because compassion can be paralysing of political action since it
implies the identification with everybody55 (at least in the Christian reading Machiavelli
wants to escape). To put it in a nutshell: if compassion is defined through “our common
human vulnerability”, then it is directed equally at both the just and the unjust person,
at those who create the cruel condition of the world and at those who suffer it. If you
want your action to produce (good) political consequences you have to detach yourself
from this universal identification with everybody. You should distance yourself from the
concrete pain you create intervening in the world in order to change it. So, several
tragic facts are underlined  by Machiavelli: to act is to take side, to take side is to be
partial and to set aside (partially, temporally) compassionate (and universal)
considerations, thanks to political action we can decrease the prevalent cruelty56  ... etc.
And it is from these “tragic facts” that would arise Machiavelli’s ironical solution. That
is, Machiavelli chooses irony, rather than compassion, as the key concept of political
action.
                                      
55 See A. Arteta: La compasión..., op.cit., pp. 140 ff, 192 ff, etc.
56. Nowhere in Machiavelli’s works does one find any precept to inflict "unnecessary" or
gratuitous cruelty. So one should refer in this context to the principle of an economy of
violence as guiding principle of Machiavelli's teaching. (See S. Wolin: Politics and
Vision. Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought, Boston: Little,
Brown and Co., 1960; also IF, II, 36, 37, etc.) Conversely, if cruelty is linked in
Machiavelli to necessity, we already know that the concept of necessity is open and,
therefore, allows one to redefine it constantly. What may appear to be necessary to the
Florentine, might not be so for us. But it is equally difficult to think politically without
reference to "what is necessary", no matter how flexibly we construe its limits. The key
point here is that necessity does not provide comfort or solace, but force us to think
and to act with courage in a world of uncertainty.
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Thus, I think that, though it is useless to try to make Machiavelli a
compassionate thinker, it is very important not to forget the reasons for considering
Machiavelli the founder of a particular way of tragic thinking, which is clearly
connected with irony and detachment.
3. Tragedy and the Risks of Irony.
3.1. Irony and Cruelty: the Case of Machiavelli.
Machiavelli tries to establish a political knowledge which will break with
tradition assuming an ironical and critical distance with respect to the current political
modes. In this sense to forget and to detach oneself seems to be an integral part of
politics: forgetfulness of conventions, forgetfulness of the prevalent links between
morality and politics, detachment from the current discourses about power and
legitimacy.57 To gain ironical distance respect the given structures of politics means
something similar to what Socrates did in Athens, but with a very different intention. In
Machiavelli´s case, the intention is structured not by the philosophical question “Know
yourself!”, but by the political problem “How to found and maintain a vivero civile e
libero”. The difference is clear. As Federico Chabod says, Machiavelli’s demon is his
“furor politico”,58 not any transcendental moral, god or religion who could help the
individual to “care of himself”.  Machiavelli puts politics first.
But, for doing so, the first thing we need, so he thinks, is to gain distance from
the usual answers (behave morally, never break the rules, comply with principles), and
to think in a new way. That is, to think from the point of view of a kind of “forbidden
knowledge”: at times you have to behave immorally, to break the rules and to forget
principles if you want to be free (and to be politically free is, for Machiavelli, the basis of
any other personal liberty). But to take this path, the path of evil,  is to take the path of
distance (from the –concrete- community), of forgetfulness (from the –given- tradition),
and of amnesia (from –current moral- principles). 59 And what is odd is that the
“forbidden knowledge” is extremely imprudent (you can not speak about it openly, as
                                      
57 For instance, D, I, pr; P, 15; ; etc.
58 See F. Chabod: Scritti sul Machiavelli, Giulio Enaudi, Torino, 1964, p. 383.
59 Amnesia is, in fact, silence. So the art of political amnesia is, at least in part, the
art of silence. The art of silence, because to forget or not to forget, is not at subject’s
disposal, but to silence some facts or moral principles in the public sphere in order
to protect liberty is always an open possibility, as I already mention commenting on
transitions from authoritarian rule.
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Leo Strauss would say), and at the same time requires a lot of prudence (that which is
needed for establishing the foundation of a free political order). And prudence, precisely,
is the key for knowing what to “forget”.
The virtuous subject of political action must be a subject capable of deciding
what to “forget” (that is, to silence) and what to remember (and to elaborate). S/he
should be able of assuming risks and consequences, capable of avoiding the
complacent self-deception involved in adopting some peculiar mechanism of
reconciliation (“it’s not me who chooses, but god, or reason, or science, or necessity or
ethnic authenticity, etc) It is clear, that this double-edge function (to silence and to
elaborate) is meant to create political liberty. In this sense, this kind of virtù is what a
republican community needs in order to deliberate collectively and adequately over the
alternative courses of action, over the common good and justice, over tragic choices. So,
according to this, political judgment must combine both distance and experience,
memory and forgetfulness, criticism and silence, political distance and closeness,
detachment and sympathy60, and this seems to be possible through the adequate
experience of the tragic conflict: compassion to foster our solidarity and our
commitment but also the proper use of irony, criticism  and detachment.
Irony is needed to change the world. Nevertheless, the main attraction of irony
is at the same time its defect. Indeed, irony may be defined by its abrasive character, by
its "enthusiasm for destroying", its "divine madness" that "does not leave stone upon
stone".61 This aspect of irony produces within it a movement of detachment from
actuality and hence from the community in which it originates.62 Nothing supports
irony, and this allows it to do with great efficacy its critical and destructive function.
But, precisely because of this, irony tends: 1. to suspend "what is constitutive of
actuality, that which orders and supports it: that is, morality and ethics"63; and 2. to
distance itself from the concrete community of human beings. (As with Socrates that
through his teachings defied the current morality in Athens and Athenian democracy.)
So irony is also a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it grants us the critical
distance which we need in order to avoid being dragged by the current. It allows us to
                                      
60. See R. Beiner: Political Judgement, op.cit., pp. 102ff.
61. See Kierkegaard: The Concept of Irony with Continual Reference to Socrates,
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989, pp.261-2.
62. Kierkegaard writes: "Irony is free, free from the sorrows of actuality, but also free
from its joys" (ibidem, p.264).
63. Ibid, p.283.
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transform ourselves and to transform politically those aspects of reality which we find
intolerable even though the prevailing values and vocabularies do not consider them so.
It allows us to ironically recapitulate the costs of the tragic choices we  face, and, in this
way, to experience the limits and shortcomings of our ways of life. But, in order to do
that, irony submits the existing cultural codes to such a destructive process that it may
impede sympathy for the community of concrete persons in which it originates. It is as
if irony remains perpetually encapsulated, isolated, "outside" the context of the shared.
This is what it means to say that irony and common sense are opposites.64
The political risk of public irony vis-à-vis the tragic choice is, therefore, the
distance that the ironic judgment maintains with from its "object". This risk is evident
in some of the Machiavellian solutions to the different problems produced by the
tension between common good and justice. The ironical distance gained by Machiavelli
with respect to the prevailing vocabularies of justice in his world (Christian morality),
permits him to counsel political actions of extreme cruelty and charged with injustice
for their victims.65
The insecurity, uncertainty and cruel laws of the goddess Fortune define, for
Machiavelli, a political context characterized by an absence of trust in which the
unexpected is also dangerous. Irony presents itself, in this case, as a weapon against
dependency and servitude, against heteronomy and slavery. By escaping the prevailing
vocabularies that tried to account for, and reconcile, this situation, Machiavellian irony
must confront the fact that the use of cruelty may be (and often is) a recourse against
the prevailing and menacing cruelty and injustice. The model which is chosen to give
form to this kind of reflection is that of consequentialist judgment, that is, judgment in
accordance with the results of the action.
For Machiavellism as well as for strategic thinking, the Machiavellian lesson is
summed up in the idea that "the end justifies the means". The obligatory quote is the
following: "It is a sound maxim that reprehensible actions may be justified by their
effects, and that when the effect is good (...) it always justifies the action" (D, I, 9, my
emphasis).  Here one should note the urgency with which the English translator makes
Machiavelli say that such an action is justified. Yet, in fact, the term used by the
                                      
64. See R.Rorty: Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1989, p.74.
65 See, for instance, P, 7; P, 15; P, 18; etc. On appearances and fraud, that is, on
what has been called “l’illusionnisme politique” of Machiavelli, see L. Vissing:
Machiavel et la politique de l’apparence, PUF, Paris, 1986. Also D, I, 35; D, III,
3; D, III, 17; D, III, 21; etc.
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Florentine writer is not "justify", but, in moral terms, the more tragic and less
comforting one of "excuse": "accussandolo il fatto, lo effetto lo scusi; e quando sia buono
(...) sempre lo scuserà".66
Similarly, another crucial quote on this topic says: "For when the safety of one's
country wholly depends on the decision to be taken, no attention should be paid either
to justice or injustice, to kindness or cruelty, or to its being praiseworthy or
ignominious. On the contrary, every other consideration being set aside, that
alternative should be wholeheartedly adopted which will save the life and preserve the
freedom of one's country" (D, III, 41, my emphasis). Here again, the Italian words
corresponding to the emphasized phrase are: "postposto ogni altro respeto". That is, the
terms used by Machiavelli are "postponed" and "respect". There doesn't seem to be
much solace or comfort in this. Whereas to postpone something means to recover it
afterwards, to respect something means that is compulsory to pay attention to it. So, a
certain tragic tension is maintained in the words “postponed” and  “respect”, in spite of
the force with which Machiavelli recommends the alternative course of action derived
from ethics of responsibility, to put it in Weberian terms.
But, in spite of the tragic nuance that one may want to introduce here, the
Machiavellian solution has its price. And that price is, again, the silence about the
victims that are sacrificed for the sake of the political end that is pursued. In fact,
consequentialist judgment (when it occurs in connection with an ironical subject)
counsels setting aside the voice of the victims and their suffering. It is as if irony turned
against itself and argued, for example, that the subject who makes use of it should
avoid any empathy with the victims that constitute the "cost" or the defeated side of the
ironical judgment.67
It seems to me that this price or, rather, the risk of having to pay this price, is
more pertinent to the Machiavellian theory than the famous Straussian thesis on
Machiavelli as the teacher of evil. As we already know, what is tragic in the teaching of
Machiavelli is not that it turns evil into goodness, but rather in that it tries to make us
aware of the political limits of goodness, of the deep relationship between good and
evil, of the good (political) outcomes that evil may produce.
                                      
66. See the similar comment made by Q. Skinner: The Foundations of Modern
Political Thought, I, op.cit., p.184.
67 It is this what Kafka tries to tell us?: “He found the Archimedian point, but he
used it against himself; it seems he was permitted to find it only under this
condition”.
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The tragic Machiavelli, Machiavelli in his best moments, is acutely aware of the
necessity of action as well as of the tension between common good and justice, and he
does not attempt to reconcile them or to invoke a theological 'justification' so as to find
solace and comfort. For Machiavelli the real problem is not the reconciliation of this
tension, but what type of subject can bear this situation and survive. That is, what type
of virtù would be preferable in a republican community in order to allow for both the
exercise of irony and the survival of political bond.
But all of this, no doubt, does nothing to change the fact that the terms of the
problem, as they are set out in Machiavelli's teaching, connect cruelty and injustice we
do to others with nothing less than what happens to be necessary to obtain political
autonomy and freedom. And the problem is, as I already mention, that a certain later
revolutionary tradition has found in these teachings a fertile ground for connecting the
cruel exercise of irony with the transformation of political conditions in an allegedly
emancipatory sense.  For a certain discourse of modernity, the point was to exercise
cruelty and injustice on the concrete community, justifying these actions through the
concepts of necessity or of the irresistible progress of peoples or of our search for
(ethnic) authenticity or of the infallible march of history, whilst it usually scorned the
tragic conflict.68 The political consequences of this focus on the problem are well-known
and do not require further explanation.
But even if we abandon this tradition of thought, we still have to handle with
much care Machiavelian teaching, because it is rather true that, if one is to believe him,
very often the foundation or maintenance of a free political order could have a moral
cost: to do evil under certain circumstances. Furthermore, together with the connection
between good and evil, autonomy and cruelty there is the link between liberty,
discipline, and power. To say it with Gennaro Sasso: “Dove infatti c’è libertà ... ivi
conviene che sia anche potenza ... [and, on the other hand,] la condizione della potenza è
... la libertà”.69 Everything seems to be internally connected and, so to speak, there is no
                                      
68. In Hegel one can see some of these traits. Thus, with respect to tragic conflict: "The
self-consciousness of heroes (like that of Oedipus and others in Greek tragedy) has not
advanced out of its primitive simplicity either to reflection on the distinction between
act [Tat] and action [Handlung], between the external event and the purpose and
knowledge of circumstances, or to the subdivision of consequences. On the contrary,
they accepted responsibility for the whole compass of the deed." (G.W.F. Hegel: Hegel's
Philosophy of Right, English translation by T. M. Knox, London: Oxford University
Press, 1967, par.118, my emphasis.)
69 See G. Sasso: Niccolò Machiavelli, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1980, pp. 553-5. Also, D,
II, 2. Against this see M. Vatter: “The Machiavellian Legacy: Origin and Outcomes of
the Conflict Between Politics and Morality in Modernity”, European University
Institute, Working Papers, SPS 99/2.
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innocent political position. There is no escape from the deep seated interrelationships
that often exist between good and evil, irony, autonomy, and cruelty, liberty and
disciplines, power and justice.
3.2. Domesticated Irony?
It is probably because of these dangerous connections that the pragmatic
liberalism of Richard Rorty opts for a solution to this dilemma which consists, literally,
in domesticating irony. The Rortyian ironist knows that her permanent doubts about
the inherited vocabulary constantly induce her to redescribe herself and everything that
surrounds her in new terms. She also knows that "redescription often humiliates" and
that this fact is incompatible with our liberal democratic ethos which defines itself by
considering the cruelty inflicted on others "as the worst thing we do".70 Therefore Rorty
argues for the need to use irony in a limited and specific territory, namely, in the private
sphere: only private irony leaves a space for liberal hope.
Thus, the continuous doubts of the ironist with respect to the prevailing liberal
vocabulary, her conviction about the contingency of the liberal community and its
language, her knowledge of the power of redescription,71 must not contaminate the
principles of solidarity that have to support the functioning of the public sphere. In this
sphere the goal is no other than the increase of our solidarity, of our sensibility towards
humiliation, of our identification with the strange and the alien, of our sympathy and
closeness with the victims, in short, of our liberal-democratic culture and values. On
the other hand, the private sphere is the sphere of ironical self-creation, of the search
for the sublime, of the transformation of the self and the constant recreation of our
individual identities. In short: the liberal-ironist believes in liberal common sense for
the public and in irony and recreation for the private.
                                      
70. See R. Rorty: Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, op.cit., p.90, also pp.xv and 146,
etc. The definition of the liberal as a person who "put[s] cruelty first" comes from J.
Shklar: Ordinary Vices, Cambridge and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, p.44: "It seems to me that liberal and humane people (...) if they were
asked to rank the vices, put cruelty first. Intuitively they would choose cruelty as the
worst thing we do". Also p.2: cruelty is "intolerable for liberals, because fear destroys
freedom". Also A. Arteta: La compasión. Apología de una virtud bajo sospecha,
op.cit.. And, of course, the source of all that: M. De Montaigne: Essais, op.cit.
71. See Rorty: Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, op.cit., pp.73-74: "I call people of
this sort 'ironists' because their realization that anything can be made to look good or
bad by being redescribed, and their renunciation of the attempt to formulate criteria of
choice between final vocabularies, puts them in the position Sartre called 'meta-stable':
never quite able to take themselves seriously because always aware that the terms in
which they describe themselves are subject to change, always aware of the contingency
and fragility of their final vocabularies, and thus of their selves".
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It has been pointed out that this distinction is problematic, among other
reasons because of the impossibility of distinguishing clearly between the public and
the private.72 Although I still think that this is correct, it is not the main difficulty with
the Rortyian strategy. The main problem is not that such a distinction is impossible,
but rather that it is not even desirable.
In the first place, it seems that nowadays the risk does not lie with irony. The
risk is not that we may all turn into Machiavellistic, cruel ironists in the style of O'Brien
in Orwell's 1984. Certainly cruelty plays a very important role today in political
alternatives such as radical nationalism, or fundamentalism of several kinds, or neo-
fascism, racism, xenophobia, etc.73 So it is not that Rorty is completely wrong in fearing
some kind of 1984 if we let irony and detachment to "circulate freely" in the public
sphere. I think, nevertheless, that all these alternatives have lost the normative battle
with the values and beliefs of liberal-democracy. Normatively speaking, when they want
to justify themselves, they use (and abuse) certain key values that belong to democracy.
When they want to justify exclusion, racism, xenophobia, or whatever, they refers to
values such as "self-determination", or "the right to be different", etc. That is the reason
why I think that in our apathetic democracies, the main risk of irony lies elsewhere.
When tragic political judgment is deactivated, when it is reconciled or hidden
from the population, when the prevailing vocabulary steels itself against irony, when
the tensions and limits of our collective identity vanish through a sleight of hand, that
is, when the ironical distance disappears from the public world and we are left with the
conventions of common sense, then the risk is that the citizens of our liberal
democracies will become characters of another negative utopia, no less famous than the
one cited above. The risk is that they will become inhabitants of the Brave New World
of Aldous Huxley, shielded against tragic tensions and their political consequences
thanks to generous doses of soma.
                                      
72. See, for example, R. del Águila: "Emancipation, Resistance and Cosmopolitanism",
New School for Social Research. Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal, vol. 18,
n.1, 1995.
73 No doubt, there is also a lot of cruelty in real liberal democracies (inequalities,
poverty, domination, etc.) That is the reason why, as we will see soon, we can not
eliminate irony and criticism from the public sphere. But the normative ideals of
liberal-democracies are, precisely, that cruelty should be eliminated, whereas
normative ideals of the rest of alternatives I have mention put first some other value
(authenticity, "salvation of the soul", etc.)
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So to keep the public sphere free of irony, and to routinize the vocabulary in
terms of the existing liberal codes is also risky. Namely, no political order, no
vocabulary, no matter how open and flexible (and thus not even our liberal-democratic
vocabulary), permits the description in adequate terms of any possible cruel, unjust
and humiliating trait in communitarian practices. In other words, "no order can enable
everything to flower in the same garden: this is a 'necessary injustice', as Nietzsche
would put it, within the practices of justice".74 Or,  "no political system can satisfy the
discontents and differences the social condition creates within and between us".75
That is, if every collective identity (if our liberal-democratic identity) generates
differences, tensions, divisions and limits by the mere fact of its constitution, may be
irony will allow us to have access to a dimension of the contingency of our community
capable of politicizing these differences and tensions and open a space where we can
give them public expression. It may be the case that public irony and the admission of
the contingency of our liberal democratic community and its vocabulary has no better
breeding-ground than the consequent experience of tragic conflict and tragic choice
properly combined.76
In other words, this problem has two different aspects: 1. autonomy and liberty
entails risks (if we were to fully and blindly assume its attainment at any cost it would
lead us towards some form of tyranny77); but 2. abandoning its search would leave us
helpless before slavery and dependency. Paraphrasing Michel Foucault, we could say
that any course of action is dangerous, but that does not exempt us from the necessity
of deciding and acting.78 Machiavelli’s words on this are well known: “I believe, believed,
                                      
74. See W.E. Connolly: Identity/Difference. Democratic Negotiations of Political
Paradox, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1991, pp.159-160.
75. See J. Shklar: Faces of Injustice, New York and London: Yale University Press,
1990.
76 Though I have no space to explain in detail the differences, I would like to
underline the fact that these tragic dilemmas are to be distinguish from J. Gray’s
Agonistic Liberalism and Samuel Huntington’s Clashes of Civilization. In my view,
both theories are too much closely connected with the primacy of culture over
politics. See, J. Gray: “Agonistic Liberalism”,  ????????, ; S. Huntington: The Clash
of Civilization and the Remaking of World Order, Simon & Schuster, New York,
1996.
77. The Bacchae of Euripides "(...) takes some of our fondest, noblest aspirations, such
as liberation and objectivity, shows their power, attractiveness, and necessity, but also
their powerlessness, partiality, and fictiveness. Against and with Foucault, it implies
that liberation, like false consciousness, can be given up at the risk of becoming a slave
and only embraced at the risk of being a tyrant". (P. Euben: The Tragedy of Political
Theory. The Road not Taken, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990, p.48.)
78. The words of Foucault are: "My point is not that everything is bad, but that
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and always shall believe that what Boccacio says is true: that it is better to act and
regret, than not to act and regret anyway” (“è megglio fare et pentirsi, che non fare et
pentirse” -Lett., Francesco Vettori, 25/2/1514).
4. Final Remarks: Was Machiaveli a Tragic Thinker?
Machiavelli’s theory of political action cannot be understood exclusively in
strategical terms. This sort of interpretation would force us to understand Machiavelli’s
theory as the story of an isolated and unbound subject pursuing whatever ends at
whatever moral cost. Or of a tyrant who tries to create, to maintain, and to develop
his/her power at any price. Or of whoever is capable of thinking and acting setting
aside any moral considerations and focusing him/herself on the technical problems for
reaching whatever goal s/he considers appropriate. I have suggested that the main
source of this kind of political action in Machiavelli’s writings is to be found in his
profile of the new prince. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that some texts do not support
this interpretation since they link the new prince with a specific political end: the
common good of the subjects. Thus, though merely strategic thinking can learn a lot
reading Machiavelli, it would impoverish our understanding of the Florentine to read
him in exclusively strategical terms.
This is the reason why I have analyzed the transformation that “strategy”
experiences when it is understood “inside” the republican reading of Machiavelli. In this
case, the goal of action is strongly political: the creation and development of a free
political order. The attainment of this political goal is considered to be shared by
virtuous citizens acting in plurality and competition. So the subject(s) of political action
cannot be neither “isolated” nor “unbound”, but rather closely related to the fellow
citizens and deeply concerned about republican traditions. Furthermore, they should
be virtuous and capable of learning through participation about the joys and the costs
of the art of creating, maintaining, and developing their common liberty. Thus, the
attainment of a vivere civile e libero is not the “technical outcome” of the functional
choice of proper means. In the republican reading, means mediate ends, that is, they
are conducive to the end but part of the end themselves. So means are to be considered
not only from a technical perspective, but also from an immanent one: they should
never eliminate the conditions for the flourishing of some values and institutions
                                                                                                             
everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. If everything is
dangerous then we always have something to do. So my position leads not to apathy,
but to a hyper- and pessimistic activism". ("On Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of
Work in Progress", in: The Foucault Reader, edited by P. Rabinow, New York:
Pantheon Books, 1984, p. 343).
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(virtuous citizens, free institutions, good laws...) Precisely because of that, wherever you
fight, and fight well, to reach the proper political goal through the proper means, you
will be praised, even if you are defeated. You should never surrender, despite
misfortunes and even “despite consequences”(!) (for your comfort, for your life, for your
immediate interests). Because virtuosity in action is so crucial in this reading, I have
called it a Quixotic conception of virtù.
Nevertheless, we soon discover that still those republican citizens have to
perform actions against current morality to protect the common good (that is, to protect
the attainment of the supreme political goal). So we have to re-read the republican
interpretation of Machiavelli’s theory of political action from a tragic point of view: that
of the collision between justice and common good.
Both justice and common good embody a different ethical standpoint. So the
problem should not be understood in terms of static spheres or realms (clearly
separated, self-referentially ordered, etc.), but rather in terms of choosing between
alternative courses of action from different perspectives. A virtuous subject of action
who identifies properly the common good is also aware of the fact that in pursuing a
particular course of action at times s/he has to perform actions which may be
considered to be against current morality. If s/he is to put common good first, then may
be s/he has to “postpone” justice and to “excuse” some moral transgressions. The use
of moral dubious means is not justified, but only excused, by the attainment of certain
consequences (consequences which integrate principles: the creation, maintenance,
development of a legitimate political order). Good and evil, power and justice, common
good and morality, disciplines and liberties, autonomy and cruelty, etc., are so deeply
intertwined as to prevent any attempt to separate them neatly. This is the internal
tension which is at the core of Machiavelli’s theory of political action. An internal
tension which has produced a “wound” in Western political thought.
38
TABLE 3. THE TRAGIC MODEL OF POLITICAL ACTION
1. Subject (Founder or
Republican Citizen)
1.1. Education Through
Tragic Choices
1.1.1. Proper Balance
Between Compassion and
Irony
1.1.2. Proper Balance
Between Remembering
(Defeated Side of Political
Judgement & the Victims)
and Silence.
2. Means 2.1. Transgression of
Current Morality
2.1.1. Alternative Courses
of Action
2.1.2. Common Good and
Justice.
2.2. Consequentialist
Judgement.
2.2.1. "Scusare" and
"Postponere"
2.2.2. Good and Evil
Intertwined
3. Ends 3.1. Vivere civile e libero.
Maintained and developed
through plurality and
competition, under
conditions of risk and
uncertainty.
3.1.1. So the ends are
neither given, nor fixed,
nor crystallised, and its
attainment is uncertain
and insecure.
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To summarize, according with the tragic model of political action:
1. A virtuous subject of action (founder of the republic or republican citizen)…
2. is capable of identifying properly the common good and the needs of the political
community and…
3. is also capable of identifying and choosing among the alternative courses of
action (which are tragically in conflict with morals and with one another) that, in
the midst of contingency and risk, may be conducive to the ends pursued.
4. Besides, s/he is aware of the close and disturbing connections that exist
between  justice and power, good and evil, autonomy and cruelty, etc. and of the
fact that these deep seated connections produce an unavoidable wound in
political thought and action.
In fact, many efforts have been made to heal that wound. The discipline of
reason of State, the concept of necessity, etc. are but some of them. Also different
attempts have been made from concepts such as “scientific certainty”, “rational
mastery”, “unavoidable progress of humanity”, etc. All of them may be considered
working in the same direction: to avoid the tragic conflicts and to substitute them by an
indubitable rule coming from the perfect harmony of the world.
This is completely anti-Machiavelian. For him action is linked to uncertainty
and risk, and the proper question is not how could we dispel them, but what kind of
political subject and what type of political virtù are needed to face this situation. We are
installed in a world of tragic choices that can be neither ordered nor justified by any
theological sanction (neither by god, nor by reason, nor by necessity, science, progress
or history). So the concrete experience of tragic conflict appears to be crucial. The
experience of tragic conflict shows the limits and fragility of our ways of life, of the
vocabularies in which we express them, of the political space in which we order them.
And this remains true even in our times, that is, even in the times of hegemony of
liberal democracy. It is the experience of tragic conflict which permits us to combine
compassion and irony, to empathize with victims and to criticize the prevalent political
arrangements.
But, after all we have been saying, could we consider Machiavelli as a tragic
thinker? Does he think in tragic terms? Does he experience and learn from tragedy in
the way we are vindicating? It seems to me that we can now answer these questions
directly. We can find in his works the following reasons to consider him so:
1. Good and evil are intertwined; goodness has political limits; evil may produce good
political outcomes; even a free political order has a moral cost; individual and collective
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autonomy may need moral transgressions to be created, maintained and developed.
2. Ultimate values are often not compatible with one another. There are circumstances
that prevent the adequate fulfilment of two valid claims. To choose is tragic because we
cannot guarantee that what we are choosing is self-evident or perfect (right, just, true,
necessary, etc.) Nevertheless, we can offer arguments and reasons that support the
tragic choice we have made (to offer this sort of arguments and reasons is precisely
what Machiavelli did in his works).
3. Machiavelli never tries to “transvaluate” values: evil remains evil; good, good; cruelty,
cruelty. He invents no “theological” sanction (god’s will, unavoidable historical
necessity, etc.) to hide this fact. He does not try to give us solace saying that is someone
else who choose or that the choice would have no moral or political costs for us.
4. In choosing a course of action (under uncertainty, contingency and risk) we have to
give up the other. Every tragic choice entails a loss. Nonetheless we have to choose.
Choice is unavoidably linked to human political condition (this is what liberty is about).
5. Ends do not justify means. At most, ends “excuse” the use of certain means under
certain circumstances. Besides, moral considerations about means are not eliminated,
but “postponed”.
For all these five important reasons Machiavelli is clearly a tragic thinker.
Nevertheless we can find also two reasons to deny him that title:
1. He did not face this situation with anguish. He never showed compassion for the
possible victims the (tragic) choice might create.
2. He took little interest on the reasons which would incline us to choose differently,
that is, he took little interest on the “defeated side of political judgement”.
It seems to me clear that these two reasons “against” considering Machiavelli a
tragic thinker do not really answer the question we are posed, but rather this other one:
“how does Machiavelli experience the tragic choice? Does he experience it in the ‘proper
way’?”. If we think the ‘proper way’ is to be understood following Aristotle (compassion)
and Arendt (defeated side of political judgement), then it seems that he does not
experience it properly. He does not seem to fit the aristotelian-arendtian theories of
tragedy. Or, better, he does not show clearly those emotions needed to be consider as
experiencing properly tragic choices (if we are to follow that tradition of thought).
Of course, we can turn to Nietzsche looking for an alternative in experiencing
tragedy and trying to establish if Machiavelli might be interpreted in a Nietzschean way.
As is well known, Nietzsche considers a mistake to link tragedy, as Aristotle
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does, to “two depressive effects”, namely, compassion and fear. In his view, the proper
way of facing tragedy would be that we become heroes and “in the midst of tragic horror
say to [ourselves] ‘yes’, [since we are] hard enough to feel suffering as pleasure”79. This
idea (this transvaluation of emotions) is connected with amor fati, love of fate, that is,
with seeing “as beautiful what is necessary in things”80. It is also related to another
basic  assumption: “what does not destroy me, makes me stronger”81, and, possibly,
with what has been called a “secret alliance between joy and pain”82.
I do not see any possibility of interpreting Machiavelli following this track. None
of these ideas is relevant in Machiavelli’s work. Unless we get rid of some of the
metaphysical flavor they have (fate, etc.) and we consider Nietzsche as saying, more or
less, the following: any experience involves pain, suffering, change, death, etc.; but to
reject this is to deny existence as such, so our task is to make that suffering active and
turn it into a way of “organizing power as agency”.83 In this case, Machiavelli could
agree on making suffering active, on considering power as the basis of human agency,
and also on the need of a certain detachment of compassion in order to build that
agency. We already know that the route Machiavelli chooses to make this possible is
that of irony. It is through irony, detachment and criticism that the Florentine thinks
we can transform the world. And this is the reason why some (i.e., Berlin) denies him
the title of “tragic thinker”. He would be too much ironic and critic with the prevailing
political arrangements to be compassionate. After all, if compassion is directed to
everybody, since it is based in our common human vulnerability, what we need is not
that, but to take side and to fight in order to transform the given situation. It is true
that this links irony to cruelty and both to the transformation of the world. But, what
could be consider more tragic than that?  What could be more tragic that the tension
that springs from the relation of compassion, irony and transformation of the world ? It
is not tragic to state that irony and detachment from compassion are needed in order to
                                      
79 See F. Nietzsche: The Will to Power, english version W. Kaufmann & R.J.
Hollingdale, Random House, New York, 1967, pars. 851-2.
80 See F. Nietzsche: The Gay Science, english version W. Kaufmann, Random
House, New York, 1974, par. 276.
81 See F. Nietzsche: Twilight of Idols, in Portable Nietzsche, english version W.
Kaufmann, Penguin Books, New York, 1954, par. 465.
82 See C. Rosset: Joyful Cruelty, english version D.F. Bell, Oxford University Press,
Oxford & New York, 1993, p. 30. Also M. Heidegger: “Tragedy, Satyr-Play, and
Telling Silence in Nietzsche’s Thought of Eternal Recurrence”, in Why Nietzsche
Now?, D. O’Hara ed., English version D. Farrel Krell, Indiana University Press,
Bloominhton, 1985, pp. 25 ff.
83 See M. Warren: Nietzsche and Political Thought, The MIT Press, Cambridge
Mass., 1988, pp. 190 ff.
42
act properly and to transform the given? It is not tragic to affirm that moral
transgressions are here to stay and that no matter what we feel about them, they will
remain with us? It is not all these the best examples of Machiavelli being a tragic
thinker? True, once posed the problem Machiavelli does not solve it. But, Should he?  It
is it a conditio sine qua non for tragedy to know in advance that there is a “solution” to
it? Quite the contrary.
And precisely because he does not solve the problem he can be consider
properly speaking, a tragic thinker, that leave us the responsibility for choosing, for the
quantity and quality of transgressions, for the balance between irony and compassion,
etc. So, like Odiseus we sail between Carydbis and Scylla. We have to avoid the world of
irony unbound, the world of cruelty represented by Orwell’s negative utopia, 1984 and
some contemporary implacable political alternatives (from communism to fascism and
radical nationalism). But we ought also to avoid the complacent, impeccable and self-
indulgent world of Brave New World, with enough soma to make citizens “happy” and
slaves at the same time.84 Machiavelli’s theory tries to work inside this tension and, at
his best, might help us to do the same. Wary as we should be of a certain European
form of doing politics that has made our continent the "daughter of excess",85 may be
we need to create a proper balance through the combination of compassion and irony to
breed our political judgement. Because it is through judgement, prudence and practical
knowledge that we have to face the main tragic choices in our political world.
                                                                                                             
84 This is, I think, one of the dangerous developments of liberal democracy today.
85. The expression is Albert Camus' in the following context: "Greek thought always
takes its stands upon the idea of limit (...) Our Europe, on the contrary, is the daughter
of excess (...) [But] Nemesis is watching, goddess of moderation, not of vengeance. All
those who go beyond the limit are by her pitilessly chastised". (Selected Essays and
Notebooks, edited and translated by P. Thody, Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin
Books, p.136.)
